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NATURAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE COMMON LAW OF
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
TANG HANG WU*
A INTRODUCTION
Two leading restitution scholars have recently argued that the notion of natural
obligations is now an important defence in the law of unjust enrichment. 'In par-
ticular, the late Professor Peter Birks asserts, in his last book, that 'the claimant
cannot say that the money was not due if, behind the technicalities of the law,
there was still a moral obligation to pay.' This development is interesting because
the concept of natural obligations is traditionally thought to be a civilian and not
a common law concept. Birks' assertion represents an attempt to use the study of
comparative law to interpret the common law and argue that certain civilian con-
cepts are found in (or should be transplanted into) the common law. This paper
is an investigation into whether such an endeavour is necessary to develop the
common law of unjust enrichment. On a jurisprudential level, this paper also
serves as a contemporary case study on whether it is desirable to engage in an exer-
cise of legal transplant of a civilian concept into the common law.
B WHY IS THE CONCEPT OF NATURAL OBLIGATIONS POTENTIALLY
SIGNIFICANT IN THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT?
In order to understand how natural obligations might potentially be relevant to
the law of unjust enrichment, we would haxve to look closely at this concept. What
then is a natural obligation? Unfortunately, Birks does not develop this idea fur-
ther saxve for citing A/loses v AlacFerlan,4 where Lord Mansfield said that restitution
is barred:
* PhD, LLI (Cantab), LLB (NUS', Associate Professor, National University of Singapore. I am
indcbcd to Grahan Virgo, Andrew Burrows, Craig Rothicrhan and an anonminous rc'crec for
reading an earlier version of this paper and their many helpful and insightful comments. The usual
caveais apply.
1 P Birks, Uiup.t Emichment (21d edn OUP, Oxford 2005' 257 258; D Sheehan, 'Natural Obligations
in English iaw' [2}004] IMCIQ 172. Sec also G Virgo, The Pnim plei ofthe Law ofRetitution (2nd edn
OUP, Oxford 2006) 671, which seems to impliitly endi-ors the 0.1, ept of a natural obligation as a
d(lcln(Ic.
2 Birks (n 1) 2,O.
S( cc also D Shechan, Vgotiorur Gestio: A Civilian Conctp1 in the Common lm ?' (2006) 1( 1CQ253.
(1760' 2 Burr 1005, 1012 1013; 97 ER 676, 680 681; Birks (n 1) 257.
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for money paid by the plaintiff, which is claimed of him [the claimant] as payable in point
of honor and honesty, although it could not have been recovered from him by any course
of law; as in payment of a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations, or contracted dur-
ing his infancy, or to the extent of principal and legal interest upon an usurious contract,
or, for money fairly lost at play: because in all these cases, the defendant may retain it
with a safe conscience ...
Thus, there are four categories in which a natural obligation is said to arise which
preclude a restitutionary claim. These include payments made pursuant to the fol-
lowing transactions: (a) a time-barred debt; (b) a contract made during the age of
minority; (c) a usurious contract; and (d) a gambling loss. In this paper, these cat-
egories where no restitutionary recovery is possible shall be termed Lord
Mansfield's negative paradigm.
Why is there a renewed interest in Lord Mansfield's negative paradigm? The
reason for this is because the case of Iileinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council5 might
have rendered these categories completely nugatory as a defence since the major-
ity of the House of Lords in that case adopted a very wide view of mistake of law.
Recall in that case the claimant paid out a sum of money pursuant to a swaps con-
tract when it was not immediately apparent in light of the state of law at the time
of payment that the making of the contract was ultra vires vzs & -vs the defendant.
Subsequently, a definitive pronouncement from the courts established that the
contract was indeed ultra vires. The majority of the House of Lords (Lords Goff,
Hoffmann and Hope (J) decided that the claimant was labouring under a mistake
of law at the time of payment and was entitled to restitution. In light of the deci-
sion of Iiie/nwort Benson, a restitutionary claim could potentially be constructed
based on the allegation of mistake of law in all categories of Lord Mansfield's neg-
ative paradigm. The payor in these cases could assert that: 'I paid money based on
a mistake of law because I did not know that such payments were unenforceable.'
Dannemai correctly observes: '[e]very item on Lord Mansfield's negative list
can now be reshaped into a mistake of law'. 7 In order to salvage Lord Mansfield's
negative paradigm an explanation must be found to justify why restitution is
barred in these categories. Birks' strategy is to argue that in Lord Mansfield's neg-
ative paradigm, the existence of a natural obligation to pay on the part of the claimant
prevents him from succeeding in a restitutionary action.
8
The main structure of the inquiry conducted in this paper is three-fold. First, the
author considers whether the defence of a natural obligation is still relevant in light
of Birks' model of unjust enrichment based on an absence of basis. Second, Lord
119991 2 AC 349 (HL. See also DeulicheMogan GcjellvHM IRC 12006 UKHL 49, 120061 3 WER
781.
See S Hedley, 'Restitution Mistake of law Reform in Haste, Repent at Leisure' (1999' 58 CJ 21,
22 or a diihrc i inleipretadion o'I(,ord Hope's speech.
(G Darnetmann, 'L njust Enricl hment by Transifer: Some Comparative Remarks' (2001) 79 Texas L
Rcv 1837, 1844 1845.
8 Birks (i 1F 257 258. See also Sheehan (i 1F 172.
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Mansfield's negative paradigm will be examined in detail to see whether it is still
compatible with the modern developments of the law of unjust enrichment and in
particular the concept of mistake of law. Each category of the negative paradigm
will be investigated in detail in the sections below to see whether a bar to a resti-
tutionary claim is justified in these cases. Finally, if Lord Mansfield's negative par-
adigm does survive ilemwort Benson, Birks' argument that a wider principle, ie the
concept of natural obligations, emerges from these categories will be evaluated. In
particular, Sheehan's essay defending the notion of natural obligations in English
law will be considered and assessed in this paper." Other competing theories capa-
ble of explaining Lord Mansfield's negative paradigm will also be reviewed.
C IS THE CONCEPT OF NATURAL OBLIGATIONS STILL RELEVANT
IN THE NEW BIRKSIAN SCHEME?
This part considers whether the concept of natural obligations is still relevant if
Birks' new theory on the law of unjust enrichment represents the law.1 °
Essentially, Birks abandoned the category based 'unjust factors' approach, involv-
ing the requirement that the claimant must be able to fit the facts into one of the
established grounds of restitution before relief is allowed. Instead, he proposed a
unitary ground of restitution absence of basis. 1 Under this new approach, a
claimant is allowed recovery as long as she can show that the transfer of the enrich-
ment lacks a basis. PrimafJcie, if this new framework gains currency, it seems that
the concept of mistake is irrelevant to an unjust enrichment claim, since there is
no longer a need to look at the claimant's defective intent in the transfer of the
enrichment. Instead, restitutionary liability would depend on the questioln of
whether the enrichment lacks a basis. If this is an accurate representation of the
law, is there then a need for the concept of a natural obligation as a defence to a
restitutionary claim?
There are several responses to the argument that a defence asserting a natural
obligation is irrelevant in light of Birks' new model of unjust enrichment. The first
is that Birks himself explicitly incorporates natural obligations in his new theory. 12
Unfortunately, he did not seem to have had the opportunity to develop and
explain this defence fully. Due to the seemingly open-ended nature of this defence,
it is important to subject this concept to a thorough investigation.
It must be pointed out that Birks' new theory can be criticised as lacking in
authority and being conceptually flawed. With regard to the former point, the
framework of analysis for unjust enrichment, as accepted in a number of
(' Sheehan (n 1' 172.
'0 See gcnerally Birks (n 1).
1( 1. S Hedley, A Citcal Inhoduction to Restitution (Butterworths, London 2011 1 33 who i)roi)oses a
similar approach i.c. a lailurc ol'quidpro quo.
12 Birks (n F 257-28.
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decisions, 1 3 is as follows: (1) Has the defendant been enriched? (2) Was the enrich-
ment at the expense of the claimant? (3) Was the enrichment unjust? (4) Is there
any specific defence available to the defendant? While Birks relies on some judi-
cial decisions1 to support his proposed framework, Stevens1  has rightly criticised
the absence of basis approach as not being consistent with the decision of the
House of Lords in tleinwort Benson. However, Stevens' argument from authority
might be blunted by Lord Walker's recent statement in Deutsche 3VIorgman' where he
expressed a 'tentative inclination' to welcome any tendency to align English law of
unjust enrichment more closely to Scottish and civilian law. However, Lord
Walker (lid not feel that this was the right time to make a final decision on this
point.1 In the same case, Lord Hoflmiann did not reject Birks' new model of
unjust enrichment outright preferring to simply state that it was not necessary iii
that particular case to decide on this question. 1' Although no holding was made
in this case on this point, these observations leave the development of the law of
unjust enrichment iii the manner suggested by Birks theoretically open.
Apart fIrom the argument from authority, the present writer's criticism of Birks'
theory is the way in which he arrived at the conclusion of the inevitability of the
absence of basis approach. According to Birks, the unjust factors are a list which
can be divided into roughly two groups. Under the first group, the list of unjust fac-
tors comprises 'all the situations in which the claimant's intent was sufficiently
defective or qualified'. 1 The second list consists of all the situations where the poli-
cies behind the facts demand restitution. Consider this crucial passage:
the list of unjust factors was already miscellaneous. In principle it could admit another
reason for restitution... But absence of basis is not a deficiency of consent; nor is it a pol-
icy dictating that the enrichment should be reversed; it is also not a reason for restitution
independent of the other members of the list. This means that it cannot join either of the
two groups of unjust factors, and it cannot make a third group of its own. One could not
smuggle 'vertebrates' into a list of mammals. In the same way absence of basis cuts across
the list of unjust factors. 20
From this passage, it is clear that Birks' new scheme was motivated by a desire
to maintain conceptual tidiness iii this area of the law. However, is such a desire
sufficient to justify the adoption of an altogether new framework of analysis?
SBanque Finacire de la Cite cPar (Battenea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221 (HL) 227 (Lord Steyn); Rowe t Vale of
Il7ite Hote DC 120031 E\HC 388 (Admin), 120031 1 Lloyd's Rep 418, 421; Cre.sman v C) of
It .'nton (Sales; Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 47, [2004] 1 WIR 277, 2785.
11, keatduze Lade baik Giroe-e i ih-a/cL/iigton B( 1199414 All ER 890 (4B; ,Guime.. Maonv Ieiniitgton
& Clea Row! Lolndon BC [1 999] 013 215 (C\ );Bi ks n Ii) 110-112.
1R Stevens, 'Absence of Basis Accepted: Ur just 1Factors Rejected (s 5- 6)' in A Burrows and oth-
ers, 'The New\ Birksian Apiroach to Unjust Enrichment' (004) 12 RI , 260, 270.
16 Deutsche Moigan (n 5) 1158 .
Deutsche horgt an 5) [I 5)].
1 Deutsche Mloigan (n 5) 1221.
'9 Birks (i 1) 106.
2) Bhwks (1 1) 111.
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Apropos, as Virgo puts it: 'the law of restitution is not a work of art; something to be
looked at and admired. It is a body of law which must operate in the real world.
Elegance and function do not always go together. Far better that the body of law
works, even if it has some rough edges.'
21
On a theoretical level, a major criticism of Birks' new theory is that it is con-
ceptually flawed. Birks' project does in fact incorporate elements of unjust factors
from the category-based approach in what lie calls a 'limited reconciliation'. 22 He
does not go so far as to say that the claimant's intent is entirely irrelevant. In his
view, the relevance of the claimant's intent is 'submerged'. 23 Birks says:
a pyramid can be constructed in which, at the base, the particular unjust factors such as
mistake, pressure, and undue influence become reasons why, higher up, there is no basis
for the defendant's acquisition, which is then the master reason why, higher up still, the
enrichment is unjust and must be surrendered ... The base of the pyramid thus consists
of all the categories of deficient intent (no intent, impaired intent, and qualified intent)
together with all other causes of invalidity. All these work through 'absence of basis'. A
single proposition covers ever, case: an enrichment at the expense of another is unjust
when it is received without explanatory basis.24
Birks' scheme can be represented diagrammatically as follows:
Model of Birks' New Theory
21 Virgo (1 1) viii. Sce also E McKcndirick, 'Taxonomy: Docs it 1\aiiei in 1) Johlston aind
R Znmerrman (eds), tutsytified Euiichment: IA, Lt ues bi ComiparativePespectiz (C UP, Cambridge 2002'
627, 649 G51.
'12 Birks (n 1' 104, 116 117.
21 Birks n I) 104.
21 Birks (n 1F 116.
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This analysis is in fact an unsatisfactory half-way house between a civilian model
of unjustified enrichment and the unjust factors approach. Birks does not go as far
as prescribing that we now analyse matters in terms of whether the enrichment
was vutyustfied rather than uvtyust. Stevens quite rightly asks:
it may be queried whether a three-stage pyramid is really necessary. If we are concerned
with iyustified enrichments the intermediation of the super unjust factor "absence of legal
ground" may be thought unnecessary. Uojutfied enrichment could fulfil the normative
job done by absence of basis..2 5
Even if these criticisms against Birks' new model are misplaced, the diagram above
shows quite starkly that intent based unjust factors (for example mistake) are still
important in Birks' hierarchy, as they explain in large part why the enrichment
lacks a basis.c1 Although Birks says the relevance of intent is now 'submerged', the
presence of an unjust factor is usually the primary reason why the enrichment can-
not be rationalised as a transfer pursuant to a contract, gift or trust; the unjust fac-
tor negates the finding of a contract, gift or trust and demonstrates that such
enrichment was made without a basis. In particular, mistake remains Very perti-
nent to Birks' latest theory on two lexvels. For example, if the claimant was labour-
ing under a mistake of law (in absence of a contract) when making the transfer, this
will bring the transaction into the next level of Birks' pyramid, ie an enrichment
made where there is an absence of basis. Therefore, restitution is justified. In cases
where restitution is allowed, the mistake usually illuminates why there is an absence
of basis for the transfer of the enrichment. Even in situations where there is no con-
tract, gift or trust to speak of, the claimant's intent might still be relevant in Birks'
scheme. For example, where the claimant can demonstrate that the enrichment
was made due to a mistake in discharge of a non-existent obligation, it follows that
there is also an absence of basis for the enrichment. Thus, even accepting Birks'
new model at face Value, the enquiries under consideration in this article are still
relevant and can be easily accommodated within Birks' new framework.
D PAYMENT OF TIME BARRED DEBT
The first category in Lord Mansfield's negative paradigm is a time barred debt.
Does this restriction against recovery surxive Iinwort Benson? It is foreseeable that
such a claimant would now argue: 'I was mistaken with regard to the Statute of
Limitation. If I had known, I would never have paid the debt'. Primafadie, this
assertion seems to satisfy the elements of an unjust enrichment claim which enti-
tle a claimant to restitution.
But is such a claim sustainable? To assess this argument, we first have to
determine whether the claimant was mistaken. A mistake is a state of mind where
21 S'cwc1ns (n 15) 272.
26 A point muade by Lord \Walker in Deutshe Aloigan (n 5) 158.
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a person's belief is inconsistent with the facts.2 7 A mistake is arguably distinguish-
able from a state of ignorance. 2 ' 111 most cases, the debtor pays the money because
she overlooked or forgot about the time bar. So, can we say in such a situation that
the debtor is more properly characterised as being ignorant of the time bar but not
mistaken? On balance, this characterisation is not convincing. Although the
debtor was ignorant of the time bar, it could be said that the debtor paid while
labouring under a tacit mistake. 2 ' A state of ignorance is when the person's state of
mind is a complete blank with regard to the relevant fact.30 In this case, the
debtor's state of mind was not a complete blank with regard to the enforceability
of the obligation. Hence, it is more convincing to say that the debtor paid under
the tacit mistaken belief that the underlying obligation was enforceable. David
Securities Py v Commoinwealth Bank oJ'Australia 31 provides some indirect support for
this argument. In this case, a sum of money which was paid in ignorance of the
existence of a statute that avoided a contractual term was successfully recovered
by the payor. This case could be argued to stand for the proposition that a person
is regarded as mistaken even though the mistake was a tacit mistake as to the
enforceability of the contractual obligation.
Despite the fact that a debtor who pays out on a time-barred debt might prima
Jacie be characterised as mistaken, there are several reasons why a court should be
wary of allowing restitution. First, a restitution claim does not further the policies
behind time bar statutes. It is possible to identify four reasons why claims are barred
after a period of time, namely: (i) time bars protect persons who have paid their
debts and destroyed proof of payment; 032 (ii) 'long dormant claims have often more
of cruelty than ofjustice in them';',3 (iii) a statutory limitation scheme exists to dis-
cipline litigants for sleeping on their rights;," and (iv) it is against public interest to
ask courts to determine disputes on unreliable evidence." All these policy reasons
27 See ell)' v Solari 1841 9 M & V 51, 58, (1812' 152 ER 2I, 26; Roles vPascall &Sons [19111 1 KB
982 (CA) 987; Great Pea Shipping Ltd Taliri S age (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 14)7,
120)031 B 679, 690. See also Restatement of the Law, Second, Contracts (St. Paul, tMinn,
Anerican Law Institute Publishers 1981 1983) s 1 t1 which asserts: 'A nistake is a belieflha is not
in ac cord with the facts'.
28 See GJ oes (e), Goffandone: The Law ofRetitution (7th rev edn Sweet and Mlaxwell, Io idon 2007)
187 188; D Sheehan, '\\What is a Mistake?' (200), 21) LS 538, 539; S Hedley, 'U u Eurichnent:
A Middle Course' (2002) 2 OUCTJ 181 189; HW\ Tang, 'cs6titution lor Mistaken Giis' (2004) 20
JCL 1, 5-8. CfA Burrows, The Law ofRestitution (2ndedn Butterworths, London 2002) 144- 11,5; T
Krelbs, Restitution at Crosroad: A Comparati e Study (Cavendish, London 2001) 37;
R Grantham and C Rickett, Enichment and Retitution in Aw ealand (Hart, Oxford 2000')119 120;
Deut che Morgan (n 5) [64].
29 See Tang (n 28) 8 9.
10 EA Farnsworth, Alle tating fijtakej: Reera! and Forgiensior Flawed Perceptions (OUP, OxIfrd 2004)
31.
I 992) 175 CITR 353 (High Court of Australia).
12 A'Court v Cram (1825 3 Bing 329, 130 ER 540.
SA'Court (n 32).
Board ofTrad2 ( ci IiInc and Companj, Ltd. 119271 AC 610 (HL 628.
R B Policie atLldt Butler [19)50] I KB 76 (KB); Edwards Edward. [1968] 1 NIR 149 (P, D &
AdmIty); Bi 2 Lambeth, SodhMark and Leiu ham HealthAuthoit 1197811 \LR 382 (CA).
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account for why a court will not eibre statutorily barred claims; but these reasons
do not provide a justification for asking a court to reverse a payment by a debtor who
overlooked a time bar defence. In the latter scenario, the creditor is not asking the
court to enforce a claim. Rather, it is the debtor who is inviting the court to hel )
assert a defence ex postfacto. The primary objections to enforcing a time-barred
claim no longer exist in these circumstances. This analysis has some support from
the cases on acknowledgement and part payment of a debt.3 " The notion of
acknowledgement started out as ajudge-made rule to combat the perceived unfair-
ness of limitation statutes. Initially, the rationale for this doctrine was that if the
debtor acknowledged or made part payment on the debt, the debtor was regarded
as making a fresh promise to pay the debt."" Hence, time began to run anew from
the date of the promise. Obviously, premising a theory on an implied promise in
this context would present some formidable problems. As Lord Sumner pointed
out, the task of finding an implied promise was very difhicult since 'the decisions on
the exact meaning and effect of the precise words employed by generations of shifty
debtors, are . .. irreconcilable.' 3' Nevertheless, the rule of part payment and
acknowledgement has since been statutorily recognised, although the implied
promise justification has since been abandoned. In its modern form, s 29(5) of the
Limitation Act 1980 provides that time begins to run against the debtor afresh from
the date that the debtor acknowledges or makes part payment on the debt. The
argument that is made here is that a payment of a time-barred debt is similar to an
acknowledgement and part payment of a debt in that these are instances of admis-
sion that the debt was due. '9 Hence, the courts should not order restitution on a
payment made in ignorance of a time bar defence.
Second, the court's attitude towards time-bars has always been that it is an afr-
mative defnce which must be specifically pleaded in the defendant's statement of
case.
4
' Lord Cairns LC stressed in Dawkins v Penrhl ni that:
it cannot be predicated, that the defendant will appeal to the Statute of Limitations for
his protection; many people, or some people at all events, do not do so; therefore you
must wait to hear from the defendant whether he desires to avail himself of the defence
of the Statute of Limitation or not.
If the limitation issue is not raised, the action is perfectly sound. Thus, the court
might very well adopt a similar attitude in a case where a person pays a debt over-
looking a statutory bar. The onus of raising the defence lies squarely on the debtor.
16 See generally Surrenda Overseas Ltd v Government oJSri Lanka 119771 1 \LR5(5 (6QB).
17 See H'eTn c Hastigs (1699) I id Ravm 389.
"' Spencer 2 Hmmede 11922 2 AC 507 (HL), 531.
19 Ho ever, it is conceded ihai s 29(5) o(lhc Limitation Act 198) does not revive the caisc o'action
wvhere a (Lebtor pays a tnIe-barred (Lebt. Section 29(7' expressly stilimlates '  right of action, oii e
barred by this Act, shall no( )e, revived by any subsequent acknow\ledginent or payminc.'
'0 See Ite'teiman v Han.l Properties 119871 AC 189 (HL) 219.
'1878) 4 App Cas 5I (Hi,) 59. See also Dimore c Miton [ 1938] 3 All ER 762 (CA) 763; 11alej
Precision F gig Ltd 119791 2 All ER 548 (HL) 55.
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Finally, it is important to note that most time bars are prescriptive iii effect. The
statutes do not usually have the draconian effect of totally extinguishing the credi-
tor's right; they bar only the remedy and not the right.4 2 Most limitation provisions
are merely procedural and do not affect the underlying substantive right. Although
this distinction is slender, there are important implications that flow from it. The
right continues to exist even though it cannot be enforced by court action. Even
though a creditor cannot recover a time-barred debt by court process, the law
allows the creditor to obtain payment in various other ways. A creditor might
recover a statute-barred debt through appropriation, 3 account stated1"/ or by exer-
cising a creditor's lien."' In fact, the existence of the creditor's right of appropria-
tion weakens the argument that restitution is available on the ground of mistake of
law. Appropriation works like this: if the debtor makes a payment without specify-
ing a particular debt, the creditor is entitled to appropriate it to a time-barred debt
at any time before the commencement of proceedings. A right to restitution on a
payment overlooking a time bar would obviously be inconsistent with the creditor's
right of appropriation. If such a restitutionary right exists, the debtor could defeat
the creditor's appropriation by asserting mistake of law and demand the sum of
money to be returned to the debtor. It is highly unlikely that in abrogating the mis-
take of law bar to a restitutionary action, the House of Lords in Alanmuort Benson also
intended to abolish the right of appropriation.
Although there are convincing policy reasons for not allowing a restitution
claim where a debtor pays a time-barred debt, there is still the problem of explain-
ing in doctrinal terms why this is so. Primaface, the action satisfies all the usual ele-
ments of a restitutionary action for a mistaken payment. There is a causative
(albeit tacit) mistake of law which induced the payment. It is suggested that the
courts should lay down a rule precluding recovery iii this situation on policy
groundsit 6 This rule can be justified on the following grounds: (i) restitution would
not further the general policy of the statute of limitation; (ii) the act of payment on
a statute-barred debt might be characterised as an admission that the sum was
due; and (iii) that time bar is an affirmative defence which must be specifically
asserted by the debtor.
12 See Phillips E9;re 187() LR 6 1B 1 (Ex Ch)29; Black (lawson vPapieaerke 1 19751 AC 591 (HL) 630.
The cxceptions to thw general rule arc sections 3(2), 17 and 25(3) olhc Limilation Aci 198(), which
coul be interpreted as extinguishing the claimant's right. Section 2,5(3 thereof, however, was
repealed by ihc Patronage (Benefices) leasure 1986, s 4(3).
'13 See Mills vFoukes (1839) 5 Bing N C 155; Iash v Hodon (1855) 6 De G M & G 474; Eiend v 1 oung
[1897] 2 Ch 421.
'11 .a.sh vHodson (n 43).
45 See, S)ear t Hartj (1799, 180 1,1819) 3 Esp 8 1, 17) ER 54); Higgs t Scott (1331) 2 B & Ad 413;
cu-m, in 2 Milburn (1889) 12 Ch D 12 (CA,; Re Brockma 119091 2 Ch 170 (CA).
46 Such a rule \would be similar to the rule barring res6titionary rc:owr onc ie the 1c :ipicnt has
threatened1 to take legal proceedings. See Moore 2 Veti of Flham (1895 1 (4B 399 (CA,; W'illiam
1JVitele Ltd i (1909) 101 LT 741 (KB); T17ool&wfh Equtable Buinbg Sol 11R [)1993] AC 70 (HL)
165.
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E MONEY PAID PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS MADE DURING INFANCY
The next limb of Lord Mansfield's negative paradigm to be examined is benefits
paid pursuant to contracts made during infancy. Is restitution possible post
Jeinwort Benson? Can a person who paid money in reliance on such a contract suc-
ceed in an unjust enrichment claim premised on the assertion of mistake of law?
In order to answer these questions, we must look at the statutory and common law
developments since Lord Mansfield's time. A minor is statutorily defined as a per-
son who has not yet reached the age of 18.1 7 Essentially the modern position is this:
contracts with minors fall into one of three heads:" 8 first, contracts for necessaries
and beneficial contracts of service are valid; second, contracts where the minor
acquires an interest of a permanent or continuous nature, for example, acquisition
of shares or land, are voidable. These contracts are binding on the minor unless
she repudiates the contract while still a minor or within a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority. Finally, all other contracts that are not continuous in
nature are unenforceable against the minor unless the minor ratifies the contract
on reaching the age of majority.
Lord Mansfield's restriction against restitutionary recovery is true with regard
to contracts for necessaries and beneficial contracts of services. " "1 Since the minor
is bound by such contracts, it is inappropriate to order restitution. What is uncer-
tain is whether restitution is similarly unavailable where the minor is entitled to
avoid the contract. Can the minor or adult ask for restitution of benefits trans-
ferred pursuant to the contract? The older cases suggest that a minor is only
allowed restitution for benefits transferred pursuant to a void contract, if the minor
can establish a total failure of consideration. ' Further, what amounts to a total fail-
ure is construed strictly. As seen in Steinberg,-)" the mere fact that the minor was
allotted shares was considered as a form of consideration. Similarly, in Valentini, 52
the use of the premises for a few months was considered to be sufficient consider-
ation. And in Pearce,.,3 the use of the car for four days was enough to negative a
finding of a total failure of consideration.
Goff and Jones argue against the insistence on a total failure of consideration
before allowing restitution by saying that:
... the question should be whether the minor has made restitution in. integrn ...5 A minor
who cannot restore the status quo should be unable to avoid the contract; if he has restored
17 Family Law Reform Act 1969 s 12.
G ( Treitel, The Lau. of Contract (Sweet & M\axwell, London 2003) )39 57.
SRyd er v II ombell (1868) LR I Exch 32, 38; Zouch v Pa son.o (1763' 3 Burr 1791, 97 ER 1103.
50 See orpe c Ocerton (1833) 10 Bing 252, 131 ER 901; Valentiami C anali (1889) 24 (411) 166 (O);
Stciubeg 2 cala (Leeds) Ltd 119231 2 Ch 452 (CA); Pea ce v Brain 119291 2 KB 310 (KB).
5 Steinberg (n 50).
" ilcnt i(n 50). See also Holmes v Bo6Kg (1818 8 1aunt )50, 129 ER 481.
51 Pea e (n 50).
(' Goff and.Jones (n 28) 610.
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the status quo, he should be able to avoid the contract and recover benefits conferred
thereunder.
5 5
This analysis is eminently sensible. The requirement of total failure of considera-
tion was probably developed so that adults who provided minors with some bene-
fits that were consumed by the minor would not be on the losing end. However, a
strict insistence on a total failure of consideration before a minor is entitled to resti-
tution does not further the policy of protecting the minor from being taken advan-
tage of by unscrupulous adults and saving the minor from her own imprudence.
The insistence on a total failure of consideration makes the law lean too heavily in
favour of the adult's interest. Further, the requirement of a total failure of consid-
eration is too blunt a tool to balance the tension between protecting both the
interests of the minor and the adult.- ' The current position has the following
unfortunate effect: if the minor paid the money up-front and received some form
of consideration, however insignificant, that money is irrecoverable. This result
would therefore depend on a question of fortuitous timing of when the payment
was due under the contract. As a matter of policy, a rigid adherence to total fail-
ure of consideration would do injustice in most cases.
It is now possible to recast the ground of restitution in this area as either based
on the incapacity of the minor or as a mistake of law.' The latter point requires
some explanation. The mistake of law is with regard to the minor's ability to make
a valid contract. Once the claim is re-formulated in this way, then the restitution
claim is freed from the requirement that the failure of consideration must be total.
Any benefit provided by the adult to the minor would be analysed under the
defence of change of position instead. However, that is not the end of the story.
Just because the contract has been avoided due to incapacity does not mean that
the policies shaping the law in this area are irrelevant in the restitution analysis. It
is wrong to assume that a minor's right to restitution is simply a matter of apply-
ing the following formula:
Minor's right to restitution = (Benefits transferred by the minor to the adult)
(Benefits transferred by the adult to the minor).
In deciding whether to order the minor to provide counter-restitution, there are
two main considerations that must be kept in mind. First, the adult must establish
that she dealt in good faith with the minor and the contract was fair and reason-
able. Second (and this is where the policies on minor's contracts might affect
the restitution inquiry), the court must be careful in not indirectly enforcing the
contract that has been avoided by ordering the minor to make counter-restitution
to the adult. Therefore, the adult's right to counter-restitution ought to be limited
55 Ibid. A Btirrows (n 28) 414, 41).
S Mleier, 'Restitution after Executed Void C ontracts' in P Birks and F Rose (eds), Le,, on.$ othe Suaps
Litigation (LIP /Mansficld Prcss, Iondon 2000), 187 93.
17A lce ci()ot Benon (11 )
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to a reasonable sum and not necessarily the contract price. In some cases, where
the court may feel that it is imperative to uphold the policy of protecting the minor
from her own imprudence, the court could deny counter-restitution altogether.
The following example illustrates this point. Suppose a minor leased a very luxu-
rious flat in Knightsbridge which she could ill-afford. The minor paid a
huge deposit to the defendant and stayed in the premises for a few months before
avoiding the contract. In such a situation, the court would have to balance the
need to protect the minor from her own foolishness with the adult's right to
counter-restitution. If the court gives primacy to the former, then the adult may
not obtain full counter-restitution of the value of the rent in the open market. The
appropriate counter-restitution iii this case would simply be the value of accom-
modation which the minor would require for the relevant period of time bearing
in mind her station iii life.
Having gone through the law in some detail, we are now in the position to assess
the validity of the second limb of Lord Mansfield's negative paradigm against resti-
tutionary recovery. On balance, it is suggested that Lord Mansfield's restriction
against restitutionary recovery is only partiall true with regard to money paid
pursuant to a contract made by a minor. A minor is not entitled to restitution for
benefits transferred with regard to a contract for necessaries or beneficial contracts
of services because such contracts are binding on the minor. However, recent
developments and very influential academic commentators suggest that a blanket
rule precluding minors or adults from asking for restitution in contracts that are
avoided will not survive for much longer. The preferable position is that the minor
may obtain restitution for benefits transferred subject to making reasonable counter-
restitution of benefits received. Likewise, the adult ought to obtain reasonable resti-
tution of beiefits couferred on the mior subject to the adult making
counter-restitution to the minor. What amounts to 'reasonable' would depend on
the policy of the law in this area, ie to protect the minor from her own foolishness
an(d to prevent the minor from being taken advantage by unscrupulous adults.
F PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST PAID ON AN USURIOUS CONTRACT
For the purposes of our enquiry, it is sufficient to note that Lord Mansfield's third
example of usurious contracts has been superseded by developments in the law.)
There is now 1o general rule against payment of interests in contracts. As regards
consumer credit, the matter is now governed largely by the Consumer Credit Act
1974. Sections 137 to 140 of this Act empower the court to reopen a credit bar-
gain regarded as extortionate. This power extends even to completed trans-
See R Good,'Usury in English Law, a Comparatiwx Ouulook: Moncylcnding and iis Regulation'
(1982) 1 Ariz. Jnt'l & ( omp L 38, for a historical overview of the law of usuy
.
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actions. 19 Section 139(2) provides that the court in opening the transaction may
order inter alia an account to be taken and the creditor to repay the whole or part
of any sum paid under the credit bargain or any related agreement to the debtor.
Therefore, it is safe to say that Lord Mansfield's third limb of the negative para-
digm against restitutionary recovery is now irrelevant.
G MONEY FAIRLY LOST AT PLAY
Statutory developments have also affected the final limb of Lord Mansfield's neg-
ative paradigm. Section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845 declares all gaming or wager-
ing contracts as null and void and that no suit shall be brought in court to recover
money allegedly won upon any wager. What is interesting is that the statute does
not deal directly with the issue of whether restitutionary recovery is possible for
bets which have been paid.
After It/einwort Benson, could a gambler who paid on a wager maintain a restitu-
tionary action on the grounds that she made a mistake of law with respect to the
effect of the gambling arrangement? Although such a plea is technically possible,
it is unlikely to succeed. A gambling and wagering arrangement is fundamentally
different from an ultra vires swap transaction undertaken by a city council. In the
latter, there are strong policy reasons why a city council should not enter into such
arrangements. It is therefore unsurprising that the courts will undo the effects of
executed ultra vires swaps. However, with regard to gambling, the policy of the law
is not as severe. Although gaming and wagering contracts are null and void, the
law does not prevent parties from making bets. In fact, there is a thriving legalised
betting industry in most common law countries."o' A restitutionary right of recov-
ery, if it exists, could be potentially disastrous to this industry. The policy behind
the Gaming Act 1845 is probably based on the philosophy that the courts have
more important things to do than to adjudicate on gaming and wagering arrange-
ments." 1 Such matters are therefore treated as social and family affairs to be set-
tled outside the courts of law. This reason would therefore be consistent with a
no-restitution rule for money paid on a bet. Just as a court will not enforce a win-
ning bet, a court will not order restitution in favour of a wager paid by a losing
party.
5 Se L f (BS) Ltd c Pearson [1941] 2 KB 391 (CA) a lccision urder the Monlcli At 190() Sce
R Goode, cot.umer Credit Law (Butterworths, London 1989 47.21 47.83.
60 See Gambling Act 20()5, which contains r'gulations of all lotms of gambling in the I~mtcd
Kilgdom. For ail overview of the Gambling Act 200,5: C Rohsler and K Conlon, 'An Analysis of
ie ChiclFcatures o'the Gambling ct 2()05' (2()0) I 6 Ent T, R 226; 1) M[iers, Regulating Commercial
Gambling: Pa P Aet and Future (OUP, Oxford 2001 329 519.
61 S Smith, Ati h's hntroduon to the Low ofContract (Clarendon Press, Oxl(rd 20)) 213 14. See also
Miers (i 60) 59 60.
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There are therefore three ways to explain why a restitutionary claim ought to
be denied for money lost on a wager even if the gambler can technically establish
a mistake of law. First, there are strong social policy reasons against the court
undoing such a transaction. Second, wagers once paid are treated at law as valid
gifts. '[A] gaming loss, whenever paid is a completed voluntary gift from the loser
to the winner'6 2 and hence irrecoverable. Third, the Gaming Act 1845 is an affir-
mative statute which should be raised by the gambler. Otherwise, once the bet has
been paid, the court will treat the payor as waiving a benefit which the statute has
given her."3 The upshot of this section is that Lord Mansfield's final category
against recovery is still probably valid.
H THE SEARCH FOR A GENERAL PRINCIPLE IN
LORD MANSFIELD'S NEGATIVE PARADIGM
1 Natural Obligation as a General Defence: A Case for a Legal
Transplant?
Although Birks asserts that a surviving natural obligation is a defence to an unjust
enrichment claim6 4 he does not go on to develop what he means by this concept.
This is unfortunate because he is aware that the introduction of such a concept can
'become an unruly horse'. W_' There are two possibilities as to what Birks means by
a natural obligation. The first is to equate a natural obligation with a moral obliga-
tion. In articulating the defence, Birks uses the word 'moral' twice. However, this
interpretation of Birks' work is unlikely to be correct because Birks is well known
for his disapproval of the use of the notion of morality in the law of unjust enrich-
ment. (3"' Therefore, it is more likely that Birks had in mind the second possible
meaning the technical civilian concept of natural obligations.
Sheehan explains the scope of the defence as follows:
The defence should arise where the claimant has undertaken to do an act, but the con-
tract, under which he undertook the duty, is void. Nonetheless, we see the undertaking
of the duty as worthy of some recognition. However, the reason why the contract, or
agreement, is void ought not indicate a disapproval of the act itself, or a need to protect
the claimant. We see later that this closely parallels those cases in which a moral obliga-
tion will support a contract as consideration, albeit that moral consideration is presently
substantially more anaemic than the instance of the defence.b1
u2 Lip/in Goima, v tabipale 119911 2 AC 518 (HL 362 (Lord lemplenan.
L Bridgr Sacage 884) 15 0BI) 363 (CA) 367.
Birks (n 1) 257-58.
65 Birks (n 1) 2)8.
L6 Eg P Birks 'Annual Miegunyali Lecture: Equity, Conscience and Unjiust Enric hment' (1999) 23
MUI 1, 20 23.
Sheehan (i 1) 185
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Sheehan argues that in order to discover what is a natural obligation we must 'go
behind the mere fact of the nullity of the contract and ask why it is void.'16' His
essay relies heavily on meticulously researched historical and comparative mater-
ial; Sheehan points out that the concept of natural obligation is found in inter alia
Roman, Roman-Dutch, Louisiana and Scots law.(39 In particular, Sheehan argues
that the fact that 'the presence of a natural obligation bars relief for mistake in
Scots law is a powerful indication that it should similarly do so in English law.'" °
In essence, Sheehan is advocating a legal transplant of a civilian concept into the
common law.
While Sheehan's historical and comparative work is interesting and valuable,
his methodology and conclusion is disputable.just because a particular concept or
doctrine is recognised or has a long pedigree in civilian jurisdictions does not make
for a 'powerful indication' that English law should go down a similar road. It is
important to understand why legal transplants of Roman law concepts have
happened in many countries in Continental Europe. Professor Watson who has
written extensively on legal transplants explains why legal borrowings have been
the 'most fertile' source of development in the Western world. He identifies two
reasons:
Law is treated [by lawyers] as existing in its own right; it is being in conformity with
law ness that makes law law. Hence, first, the means of creating law, the sources of law,
come to be regarded as a given, almost as something sacrosanct ... Secondly, law has to
be justified in its own terms; hence authority has to be sought and found. That authority
(in some form, which may be perverted) must already exist; hence law is typically back-
ward-looking. These two features make law inherently conservative."
If Watson is right that legal transplants of civilian concepts in European juris-
dictions are due largely to the fact that lawyers are generally 'creatures of habit'
and 'in altering the law they seek ... either to play down the extent of the change,
or to borrow a rule from some foreign legal system with great prestige and author-
ity', 7 2 then the case for a legal transplant in English law becomes less compelling.
Watson's transplant thesis may explain, on a descrtive level, why legal transplants
have been so successful in the past in European legal systems. But the reasons for
legal transplants are certainly not edifying. The transplant thesis does not provide
a normative basis on why we should adopt such a technique in interpreting the com-
mon law. An argument premised solely on the historical pedigree of Roman law
and the conservativeness of lawyers does not provide a convincing justification as
68 Sheehan (n 1' 186.
711 Sheehan (n I' I((.
U0 Sheehaii (i 1) 186.
IA Wason, The Eolution offLaw (Blackwells, Oxf'ord 1985) 119. Watso's transplanw thesis is 1icidly
summarised in \ Ewvaxl, 'Comnarative. Jurisprudence 11: The Logic of Legal Transplants' (1995
43 AmJ Comp L 489.
72 Ewal (n 73) 489, 499.
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to why we should adopt the civilian concept of natural obligations. 73 It is hard to
disagree with Professor Markesinis, another distinguished comparative lawyer,
who observed that the clinging to Roman texts and legal history 'only help
distance their authors and their ideas slowly but steadily from the real world of
practice which, in the common law world, is the bloodline of survival and regen-
eration.'T
A further reason against the recognition of natural obligations in English law is
that the concept could have potential ripple effects which might distort the law of
contract. Although Sheehan's thesis is that natural obligations are not enforce-
able,7., this is not how it is understood in some civilian jurisdictions. Many
European jurisdictions enforce promises to perform a natural obligation. In con-
trast, in English law, it is axiomatic to state that promises are only entforceable
where there is valid consideration. The best illustration of how the adoption of a
natural obligation concept might affect contract law is provided by the Trento
project on 771e Eijbrceability oJ Promises in European Contract Law.7 6 In this project,
hypothetical factual scenarios are discussed by leading commentators from vari-
ous European countries to map out the laws of European contract law. If we
accept the concept of natural obligations, then it means that the following
promises are entforceable:
(i) 'Kurt promised a large sum of money to Tony who had suffered a permanent
back injury saving (a) Kurt or (b) Kurt's adult child from drowning after a boat-
ing accident';11 and
(ii) 'Ian, now solvent and an adult, had once owed money to Anna that she could
not claim legally because (a) Ian's debt has been discharged in bankruptcy,
(b) the debt was barred by the passage of time (by prescription or by a statute
of limitations) . .. Ian now promises to pay the debt.' Ta
But this result would be at variance with orthodox English contract law. Of course,
a response to this criticism is that we should only adopt the concept of natural
obligations with regard to unjust enrichment and not contract law. But is a partial
legal transplant a valid strategy? Is it possible to cherry-pick and choose the dif-
ferent aspects of a foreign doctrine to transplant? It is this writer's view that it is
not. The concept of a natural obligation is simply incompatible with the English
notion of consideration in contract law. This will be shown later in this section.
71 See also B Markesinis, Comparative La in the Courboom and the (la.s.som (Hart, Oxford 2003' 8 11,
who argucs that lengthy relcrenccs to Roman law, oftcn add little io the tindcrstanding of the con-
mon law. In another context, lie says colourfully that modern conditions makes 'the linkhig wvith the
Roman past as iicaninglul as relet 1ing a modcrn nu(lear scientist io )DcnOcritus as thc flther ol'thc
atom theor ). '
74 Markcsinis (n 7T) 10.
71 Sheehan (n 1) 172, 173.
7( j Gordle), The Eforceability ofPromiis in European Contract Law (CUP, Cambridge 200 I).
71 Gordley (i 78) 67, 86. The French, Belgian and Austrian reporters believe that their courts would
enflirce tlc promise to perlorm a natural obligation.
7 Gordley (n 78) 88.
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The weakness of using natural obligation as a concept is further exposed by
Sheehan's analysis of Tootal Clothing v Guinea Properties. 7 The landlord, G agreed to
allow T, the tenant, to occupy the premises rent-free for three months on the under-
standing that work was carried out by T on the premises. G also agreed to pay T
_30,000 upon satisfactory completion of the work. The first agreement signed by the
parties did not mention that G would contribute to the work; it also stated that 'this
agreement sets out the entire agreement of the parties.' However, a second agree-
ment expressed as a supplemental agreement was entered into the same day which
provided that G would contribute to the cost of the work. Upon completion, T asked
G for _T30,000. G refused to pay T and relied on s 2 of the Law of Property
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 which provided inter alia that a disposition of
land must be in writing and incorporate all the express terms agreed in one docu-
ment. T's claim was successful because Scott LJ said that s 2 did not apply to executd
contracts. Sheehan says this case can be explained on the following ground:
There was a natural obligation to came out the agTeement. There is simply no reason to
go back on the agreement other than that it turned out to be a bad bargain. We recog-
nise that there is nothing wrong with a contract for the sale of land, and that the defend-
ant was not handicapped in a way that requires us to relieve him.
This analysis is unconvincing. Sheehan does not tell us wty there was a natural
obligation oil G's part to pay T. It cannot be the case that evey unenforceable
obligation would give rise to a natural obligation; Sheehan fails to identify the
crucial elements which raise a natural obligation. Also, this example vividly illus-
trates the criticism made above, ie that the concept of natural obligation has the
potential to distort the law of contract. Tootal Clothing is nothing more than a case
dealing with formalities where the court was essentially struggling with the age-old
dilemma of balancing the need for certainty in the law with regard to formalities
and the quest to do justice in the indixidual case. The Court of Appeal in this case
decided to go with the latter.8  This case has nothing to do with natural obliga-
tions. In fact, even if the second contract was avoided by the statute, liability could
be imposed oil the landlord to make reasonable restitution to the tenant."- To say
that G had a natural obligation to pay T does not tell us how we should resolve the
tension posed by the two distinct policy considerations which underlie the case.
Also, the concept of a natural obligation could potentially resurrect the doctrine of
part performance, albeit in a modified form. This is because Sheehan seems to be
arguing for a position similar to German law that performance of a contract,
which has not complied with statutory formalities, will 'heal' the contract.
However, this position is untenable, as the doctrine of part performance has been
statutorily abolished in this area.
79 1992) 64 P & CR 452 (CA). Sec Shechain n 1) 189.
Sheehan (n 1' 189.
Sce also Groiwman c Hooper [200 I] EW(CA v 615.
B2 See Pave & Matthez Ply Ltd v Paul( 1986) 162 CLR 221 (High Court of Australia).
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Ultimately the concept of natural obligation is too vague to be used as a general
defence. Although Sheehan valiantly tries to overcome the vagueness objection by
confining the defence of natural obligations to void contractual obligations which
have been performed, this restriction is still too wide to be a workable doctrine.
Contractual obligations can be void for myriad reasons such as ultra vires, lack of
formalities etc. It is not very helpful to group all these disparate categories together
and say that the courts will not reverse the performance pursuant to these obliga-
tions if these obligations are 'worthy of some recognition'' 3 without telling us
specifically what kinds of obligations are deserving of protection. It seems, in
Sheehan's view, all promissory obligations should primaJace be worthy of recogni-
tion. Sheehan says:
the reason why we deny recover-, in the void cases is . . . we cannot destroy bargains.
Fried, for instance, argues that there is a moral obligation behind every promise, and
contracts are binding because of the moral obligation lying behind the promise and
counter-promise. If we accept this, it follows that a unilateral promise once acted upon
will not bar recovery of the transferred property if the transfer was made under a
mistake.8 4
The argument that all promissory obligations are primafaee deserving of pro-
tection is too wide a starting point. With respect, Sheehan's analysis has concen-
trated on the wrong issue. We should inquire not whether the underlying
obligation that has been performed is worthy of protection, but whether the poli-
cies behind the doctrine or law which avoided the obligation will be furthered by
allowing or denying restitution. The difference between Sheehan's model and this
suggested analysis is that in the former, the courts are faced with the unenviable
task of making a judgment on the kind of obligations that are worth protecting
despite their invalidity, whereas, in the latter, the court will focus on the law which
invalidated the obligation, eg gambling, ultra vires, formalities and investigate
whether reversing the claimant's performance will subvert or further the policies
of the law which rendered the obligation void. Take the gambling example which
has already been discussed above. The policy behind the Gaming Act 1845 which
avoids gambling contracts is that the courts have more important things to do than
to decide on such arrangements. Since allowing a restitution claim would not fur-
ther the policy behind the voidness of gambling obligations, restitution ought to be
denied in cases where a gambler pays out on a wager. To be fair to Sheehan, he
does raise the policies behind the Gaming Act 1845. But his approach of inquir-
ing whether the underlying obligation is worthy of protection forces him to make
the following counter-intuitive assertion that: 'the law expects that you will pay
your gambling debts'. '
8 Sheehan (n 1) 185.
84 Shcehan (n I) 185.
8' Sheehan (i 1) 190.
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A person sympathetic to Sheehan's project of constructing a defence of natural
obligation might argue that in substance the proposed analysis of looking at the rea-
son behind the invalidity of the obligation is very similar to Sheehan's thesis. But
there is a subtle and important distinction between both analyses. In Sheehan's
model, the performance of a void obligation is prima jace irreversible because
Sheehan makes the assumption that all promissory obligations are worthy of pro-
tection. However, the analysis suggested by this writer is that restitution will only
be ordered where a claimant performed a void obligation if itJurters the policy of
the law which invalidated the obligation in the first place. In some instances like
the gambling situation, both analyses might yield the same result. But in others it
might not. The facts of tleiwort Benson provide an interesting illustration of how
both analyses might diverge. Recall that this was a case where a city council
entered into a swaps agreement with Kleinwort Benson (KB) which was ultra vires
the city council. The swaps agreement was duly performed and the city council
emerged as the 'winner' of the swaps arrangement. When the issue of ultra vires
came to light, KB instituted a restitution claim premised on mistake of law. Under
Sheehan's analysis, the city council could potentially avail itself of the defence of
natural obligation. Since the underlying obligation was a promissory obligation, it
was an obligation worthy of protection by the courts. Restitution should be denied
since the swaps agreement had been performed. But if we look at the underlying
basis of why the transaction was void, i.e. ultra vires, a strong argument could be
made justifying a result mandating restitution because this would further the poli-
cies of ultra vires doctrine. Otherwise a no-restitution rule would unfairly fa vour
those whose breach of the ultra vires rule was more flagrant.
Sheehan's analysis is also weakened by the House of Lords' rejection of the 'spent
mistake' defence in IMieiiort Benson. This defence originated from a footnote in one
of Professor Birks' essays!' Birks argued that in an executed contract, a restitution
claim should be denied because the mistake had been spent. It could be argued that
this defence is quite close to Sheehan's analysis that a restitution claim ought to be
denied because it has been performed and the underlying obligation is worthy of
recognition. Lord Goff rejected Birks' analysis by holding that this reasoning was:
incompatible with the ultra vires rule that an ultra vires transaction should become bind-
ing on a local authority simply on the ground that it has been completed .. the ultra
vires rule is not optional; it applies whether the transaction in question proves to be prof-
itable or unprofitable.
2 No Unconscientious Retention
Another way of rationalising why the claimant is barred from a restitutionary
claim when the facts fall within Lord Mansfield's negative paradigm is to say the
U P Birks, 'No Consideralion: Rcstitiion \lir Void Co(hracs' (1993) 23 UWA 1, Rev 195, 230.
A leiciwort Bemou n 5). See also the speech of Lord Hope, 1 16.
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defendant's retention of the enrichment is not unconscientious. ' This analysis is
consistent with GummowJ's judgment in Roxborogh, v Rothmans oJ'Pall MallAustralia
Ltd where the learned judge proposed a test of liability which hinges on the con-
scientiousness of the defendant's retention of the money paid. However, there are
dificulties with this rationalisation as well. The main problem with this approach
is that a model of liability based on the equitable notion of unconscientious reten-
tion is unlikely to be adopted in favour of an unjust enrichment model in
EnglandY°
Yet another serious objection with this explanation is the difficulty in pinning
down the precise ambit of unconscientiousness used in this context. Kremer, who
is one of the leading proponents of this approach, attempts to do so by arguing:
The notion of 'conscience' let in claims that were simply moral; rights that were not
strictly legal but were only claims in honour or morality, by, for example, being unen-
forceable, still sufficed. Thus, if on the facts pleaded by both parties the defendant could
point to nothing that would, in point of honour or conscience raise any semblance of an
entitlement to retain the money, M[oney] H [ad] and R[eceived] would lie."'
Therefore, according to Kremer, a defendant is entitled to retain the enrichment
if the defendant 'could point to [that] which showed some valid legal, equitable or
moral claim to be entitled to the money'.' 2 He asserts that the notion of conscience
entitles a defendant to a defence if she can demonstrate that the payment was
pursuant to rights that 'were not strictly legal but were only claims in honour or
morality'.
With respect, Kremer's analysis, which depends heavily on notions of honour
or morality, will simply not work. Putting aside the longstanding jurisprudential
debate as to whether it is possible to reconcile law with morality, it is contended
that Kremer's rationalisation of the law is flawed because he fails to articulate any
guiding principle which will help us answer this question: what exactly are claims
which are payable in honour or morality? 4 He stresses repeatedly that the con-
cept of conscience is not at large but falls to be determined according to the facts
of the case; he concedes '[a]lthough relatively few principles have so far emerged
BizetDickaon (1786) I Terin Rcp 2115, 99 ER 1097. Sec also G Palncr, The Lw ofRettution I((I1e
Brown & Co, Boston 1978) wol 111, 357 61.
12002) 185 AIR 335 (High Couirt oAusu alia), 356 64.
9o See eg Banque Enanciete (n 13'; Roe (n 13'; (,re.sman (n 13'. See also j Beatson and G Virgo,
'Contral, Unjust Enrichmcnt and UnconscionabiliIy' (2002) 118 LOR 352; P Biks, 'Failuirc of
Consleration and its Place on the Map' (2002 2 OUCLJ 1.
B Krimer, 'The Action lor Money Had and Rccciw(t' (200I ) 17JC1 93, 109 10.
92 ibid 19.
, ibid I110.
91 (1t\1 Bryan, 'Unjust Enrichiment and Unconscionability in Australia: A False Dichotomy' in
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from the cases, there are already some rough parameters to be used in determin-
ing when there is some just claim to retain'.>' Bearing in mind that there is a
paucity of principles, one wonders why Kremer advocates this theory. In his essay,
Kremer suggests that the presence of an unenforceable obligation is an example
where the retention is not unconscientious. But this does not clarify matters at all.
An obligation may be unenforceable (lue to a variety of reasons. Kremer's analy-
sis does not tell us what kinds of unenforceable obligations would bar a restitution-
ary action save for the invocation of the term unconscientiousness. This is
troubling because unconscientiousness can be an elastic concept. Take a hypo-
thetical scenario loosely based on the facts of tdy. Suppose an insured who had
been paying his premiums on a life insurance policy for years failed to do so (lue
to a clerical oversight. As a result the policy lapsed. Let us also suppose that the
insured had a huge portfolio of other non-life insurance policies with the same
insurance company and was always diligent and prompt in maintaining his pre-
miums. Subsequently, the insured died and the insurer paid the money to his
widow without realising the policy had lapsed. In such a scenario, is the widow's
retention of the money unconscientious? The fact that the beneficiary was a
widow, that the mistake was inadvertent and that the insured was a loyal customer
of the insurer for many years would lead many people to conclude that although
the policy had lapsed, the insurance company had a moral duty to make the pay-
ment. But are these factors really relevant?
The final criticism of Kremer's unconscientious retention approach is that it
does not have the explanatory force to justify why a claim made on a time-barred
debt is irrecoverable. While it is true that Lord Mansfield thought that statute-
barred claims are debts which are morally payable,93 recent case law has suggested
otherwise. In Reeves v Bucher,98 Fry LJ said with regard to a limitation defeice:
'[w]e have not to determine whether the defence here set up is handsome or con-
scientious but whether it is good at law...' Rather more emphatically, SheenJ in
The Gaz FourntairP accepted counsel's suggestion that the defence of limitation was
available to a litigant as a matter of absolute right and that there was nothing
unfair or reprehensible in raising this defence.
3 Implied Contracts
Professor Hedley has argued that many instances where courts have ordered resti-
tution are not really cases of unjust enrichment.l°° Instead, lie rationalises many
(' Kremer (n 91 117.
96 Al (n 27).
See also M/1idland Bank Trist Co Ltd v Hett, Stubbs & Actmp (a firm) 119791 Ch 38 (Ch D' 391 where
Olivcr1J said a plea of'limitation wvas 'an unattra(ltiv plea at tie best ol'timcs.'
' 118911 2 (1B 509 (CA) 511.
[1987] 2 IUoyd's Rep 1)1 (03).
1J0 S Hedley, 'Implied Contract and Restitution' (2004, 63 CLI 435.
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of the categories as examples which are 'very like a contract ... [and can be char-
acterised either as] a quasi-contract, a virtual contract, or an almost-contract.' 101
These categories are extremely similar to a contract save that there is some right
to avoid the contractual obligation, for example, failure of contractual capacity,
failure to follow the requisite formalities and failure of legality. Hedley argues
forcefully for the adoption of the following four-stage analysis to deal with situa-
tions like this:
(i) an arrangement between two or more parties which would be a contract
except for the application of one specific rule of law ('x'), and
(ii) the arrangement has been at least partly acted on, and
(iii) one party now seeks a remedy which would have arisen if the arrangement
were contractual, then that remedy will be granted so long as
(iv) it can be granted without subverting the specific rule of law ('x').1'02
If Professor Hedley is right, is it possible to rationalise Lord Mansfield's negative
paradigm against recovery on a similar analysis? In the spirit of friendly amend-
ment, we can modify Hedley's analysis as follows: we substitute stages (iii) and (iv)
with the following: '(iii) the party who performed pursuant to the arrangement
now seeks restitution for the performance; (iv) restitution should be denied so long
as it does not further the specific rule of law ('x')'.
On reflection, it is not possible to apply a modified version of Hedley's analysis
to explain Lord Mansfield's negative paradigm. The notion of implied contract is
normatively too weak as a justification for the categories listed in Lord Mansfield's
examples. The difficult unanswered question is this: why do we treat certain
arrangements as implied contracts once money has been paid? Hedley's response
to this criticism would be to say that we must look carefully at the facts and the pol-
icy concerns surrounding the case. But it is difficult to see how the notion of implied
contract contributes to our understanding of the policy underlying these cases.
Also, is it really illuminating to group together varied categories such as contractual
incapacity with instances of lack of compliance with formalities under the rubric of
implied contracts? This writer is of the view that it is not. The policy concerns of
minority contracts have little to do with contracts that are in breach of formality
requirements. Therefore, the conclusion that is reached is that as a normative prin-
ciple, the idea of an implied contract is too weak to be an adequate explanation of
Lord Mansfield's negative paradigm against restitutionary recovery.
4 A Pragmatic Analysis-Looking at the Reasons behind the Invalidity
While this paper has rejected Sheehan's and Hedley's abstraction of a general
principle to explain Lord Mansfield's negative paradigm, their work is extremely
'o' Hedley (n 1i3) 44).
lO2 Hedley n 103) 111.
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valuable because they rightly point out that the key to explaining the cases must
lie behind the reason why the obligation was rendered invalid. Instead of embark-
ing on an ambitious project of trying to find an overarching principle in this area,
a pragmatic approach is adopted in this paper. With regard to void obligations
already performed, a court should investigate the policy reasons behind the
invalidity and consider whether allowing a restitution claim would further or sub-
vert the policies of the law in question. If a restitution claim does not further these
policies, then a restitution claim should be denied. On the other hand, if a no-
restitution result would subvert the rule which rendered the obligation invalid,
then such a claim ought to be allowed.
At the moment there are two defences against restitutionary recovery when a
mistake of law is asserted as a ground of recovery emerging from Lord Mansfield's
negative paradigm. These defences sit alongside the rule that, once litigation is
threatened, a payor cannot succeed in a restitutionary claim.10 3 The first defence
is that a claimant cannot get her money back on a payment made pursuant to a
debt which is time-barred even if she can prove a mistake of law. Stated briefly,
the reasons why restitution ought to be denied in this context are because: (i) time
bar statutes are an affirmative defence which must be raised by the debtor.
Otherwise, for all intents and purposes, the claim is valid; and (ii) most statutes of
limitations do not extinguish the underlying action. In fact, the law provides the
creditor with other means to satisfy her claim such as appropriation. A right to
restitution is inconsistent with the creditor's right to appropriate.
With regard to the second defence, the rule is that payment on a gambling loss
cannot be recovered as part of money paid under a mistake of law. There are two
possible explanations for this. First, a gaming loss is treated in law as an irrevoca-
ble voluntary gift to the payee. '1 Alternatively, a gambler is taken as having
waived the benefit of the statute which avoids executory gambling contracts when
she pays out pursuant to a lost wager.'1° The Gaming Act 1845 is similar to the
Statute of Limitation in the respect that both are affirmative defences where the
onus of raising it lies with the payor. This position is justified because gambling
contracts are not per se illegal; the law only avoids executoy gambling contracts.
Also, this defence is borne out of necessity bearing in mind that there is a thriving
legalised betting industry in most countries. This business of betting may theoret-
ically collapse if a gambler is allowed restitution for money paid out on a gambling
loss on the ground of a mistake of law.
Modern developments in the law have superseded the other two categories in
Lord Mansfield's negative list money paid out pursuant to a contract made while
still a minor and payment on usurious contracts. With regard to the former, there
are strong reasons to believe that the courts will no longer adhere to a dogmatic
"" Aloore (n 46; 1 il/am ' itc 1, 1 (n 16/; Woolwich (n 6.
'04 Lipkin (1 63) 62.
1(" Brhidge" (n 61 367.
\ahtaral Obligations and U y'ast En richnent
insistence on the requirement of a total failure of consideration before a minor is
allowed restitution. Restitution ought to be ordered so long as the minor is able to
make reasonable counter-restitution to the other party and such counter-
restitution does not have the effect of acting as an indirect means of enforcing the
contract. Developments in the law have also replaced the common law concern-
ing usurious contracts. With regard to consumer contracts, under s 139(2) of the
Consumers Credit Act 1974, the courts are empowered to re-open completed
transactions.
I CONCLUSION
This paper has ivestigated whether the concept of natural obligations ought to be
imported into the common law of unjust enrichment. The basic thesis of this paper
is that such a legal transplant is unmecessary. The better view is that the law of
unjust enrichment ought to be balanced with the recognition of two defences
against restitutionary recovery money paid pursuant to a time-barred debt and
money paid in relation to a gambling loss may not be recovered simply by prov-
ing a mistake of law. These two defences are policy-based defences and they sit
alongside the defence that money paid pursuant to a threat to sue is irrecoverable.
The other important theme which has been explored in this paper is whether any
underlying principle may be discerned within Lord Mansfield's negative
paradigm. Several approaches were considered-the Birks/Sheehan civilian-
influenced natural obligation rule, Kremer's equitable unconscientious receipt
explanation and Professor Hedley's implied contract model. Ultimately, it is
suggested that noue of these abstractiols provide a helpful basis to explaiii Lord
Mansfield's negative paradigm
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